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Abstract
Neural networks are prone to adversarial attacks. In gen-
eral, such attacks deteriorate the quality of the input by ei-
ther slightly modifying most of its pixels, or by occluding
it with a patch. In this paper, we propose a method that
keeps the image unchanged and only adds an adversarial
framing on the border of the image. We show empirically
that our method is able to successfully attack state-of-the-
art methods on both image and video classification problems.
Notably, the proposed method results in a universal attack
which is very fast at test time. Source code can be found at
github.com/zajaczajac/adv_framing.
Introduction
The remarkable success of deep convolutional networks
for image and video classification (Karpathy et al. 2014;
Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012) has spurred inter-
est in analyzing their robustness. Unfortunately, it turned out
that even though neural networks often achieve human level
performance (Taigman et al. 2014), they are susceptible to
adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al. 2014). It means that the
output of a neural network-based classifier may be drasti-
cally changed by applying a small perturbation to its in-
put. We divide such perturbations into two categories: fully-
affecting and partially-affecting.
• Fully-affecting attacks generate small pixel intensity
modifications which are optimized to be hardly visible
for humans. These attacks typically have their `2 or `∞
norm constrained (Carlini and Wagner 2017; Moosavi-
Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016) and hence affect the
whole image.
• Partially-affecting attacks usually have their `0 norm con-
strained. They introduce perceptible but small occlu-
sion to the image, such as a patch (Brown et al. 2017;
Karmon, Zoran, and Goldberg 2018) or a single pixel (Su,
Vargas, and Sakurai 2017).
The attacks mentioned above either slightly modify all the
pixels of the image or occlude parts of it. However, the at-
tackers may find this to be a serious limitation and seek for
new types of attacks. For instance, consider a scenario where
they upload videos containing forbidden content. Their goal
∗Equal contribution
is to bypass video-sharing website’s filters. At the same time,
the perturbations introduced should not be distracting and all
information should be retained.
In this paper, a new attack which is well-suited for the
above-mentioned purposes is demonstrated. The method,
dubbed adversarial framing (AF), consists in simply adding
a thin border around the original input (which may be an im-
age or a video), keeping the whole content unchanged (see
Figure 1 and youtu.be/PrU9R6eFNTs for some quali-
tative results). The attack is universal (Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. 2017), which means the same AF is applied to all inputs.
The method only requires substantial computing during the
training procedure. At test time, the only extra computation
required is the appending of the precomputed framing to the
input.
Similarly to (Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018), we be-
lieve that research on attack techniques deepens understand-
ing of inner workings of neural networks. We hope that our
work and analyzing adversarial attacks in general can be
helpful in designing defenses and/or robust methods.
In this work, we consider a white-box setting, in which an
access to the architecture and weights of the trained classi-
fier is given. Previous work has shown that if only black-box
access is given, a surrogate model can be leveraged to obtain
an attack that transfers well to the original model (Papernot,
McDaniel, and Goodfellow 2016). Therefore, a white-box
model is a realistic assumption and, in fact, is the most com-
monly considered paradigm in the literature.
Method
Computing the adversarial framing
Suppose a labeled dataset of images or videos D is given.
Moreover, a differentiable classifier f has been trained so
that for each input x and class c, a probability fc(x) is as-
signed to x of being in class c.
We now present a procedure to train the adversarial fram-
ing to attack f . During training, a minibatch is sampled from
D. Every example is surrounded with the same framing,
which is the current version of the trained AF. In case of
videos, every frame of each example is surrounded with the
same framing. Then the classification loss is backpropagated
and the framing is modified using its gradients to maximize
the loss. The training continues until convergence. The fram-
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Figure 1: Examples from ImageNet with adversarial framing of width 3. Most of the images are wrongly classified as a maypole. We
hypothesize that the colorfulness of that class makes it especially easy for AF to resemble it.
Algorithm 1 Training of the adversarial framing
1: input: Dataset D = {(xi, yi)}, xi ∈ [0, 1]h×w×3, clas-
sifier f , framing’s width W
2: output: Universal adversarial framing θ
3: Initialize θˆ ∼ N (0, 1), of size 2W (h+ w + 2W )
4: repeat
5: for each datapoint (xi, yi) ∈ D do
6: xˆi ← xi surrounded by θ := Sigmoid(θˆ)
7: end for
8: update θˆ to minimize 1|D|
∑
i log(fyi(xˆi))
9: until convergence
ing’s width W is a tunable hyperparameter fixed at the be-
ginning of the training procedure.
For a detailed explanation see Algorithm 1. The algorithm
is presented for image datasets. The modification for video
datasets is straightforward.
Note that the input size is modified due to the addition of
the framing. This does not pose any issue to the CNN-based
classifier, as most modern architectures (such as ResNet (He
et al. 2016) or ResNeXt (Xie et al. 2017)) accept various
input sizes. If the classifier’s input size is fixed, the pro-
posed algorithm can be simply modified so that the image
is resized before applying adversarial framing. We investi-
gate performance under various resizing strategies further in
the paper.
Experiments
Untargeted attacks
We performed untargeted attacks against state-of-the-art
classifiers for ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015) and
UCF101 (Soomro, Zamir, and Shah 2012) datasets. We com-
pare our AF to two simple baselines. They both do not re-
quire any training and are fixed. One applies uniformly dis-
tributed random noise (RF) and another black pixels only
(BF).
ImageNet is a large-scale image dataset containing over
million images from 1000 various classes. It serves as a pop-
ular benchmark for image classification. We performed at-
tacks against ResNet-50 (He et al. 2016) model pretrained
on ImageNet. The model was taken from PyTorch Model
Zoo (Paszke et al. 2017). Results are reported in Table 1a.
UCF101 is a dataset containing realistic videos. Each
video contains a person performing some action, out of 101
possible classes. We tested our method by performing an at-
tack on a ResNeXt-101 based spatio-temporal 3D CNN – we
used model pretrained by (Hara, Kataoka, and Satoh 2018).
This model takes clips as input, each containing 16 consec-
utive frames. Results are reported in Table 1b.
Targeted attacks
As it can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, adversarial fram-
ing usually fools the classifier into wrongly recognizing one
particular class. In the case of ImageNet, this adversarial
class is usually maypole – even across different trainings.
We hypothesize that this is because of colorfulness of this
object.
In order to make sure that the performance of our attack
does not depend on presence of such special classes, we per-
formed attacks in targeted setting. In these experiments, in-
stead of minimizing the output score for the ground-truth
class, we maximize the score for a randomly selected tar-
get class. We report success rate (i.e. percentage of images
classified as a given target) for different target classes.
Results for ImageNet dataset are in Table 2a and for
UCF101 dataset are in Table 2b.
Training details
In all the experiments we used Adam optimizer (Kingma and
Ba 2014). For all the hyperparameters of the optimizer ex-
cept for learning rate, we used default values from PyTorch
(Paszke et al. 2017) implementation.
On ImageNet (Russakovsky et al. 2015) we trained for 5
epochs, with initial learning rate 0.1 decaying by 0.1 every 2
epochs and batch size 32. On UCF101 (Soomro, Zamir, and
Shah 2012) we trained for 60 epochs, with initial learning
rate 0.03 decaying by 0.3 every 15 epochs and batch size 32.
On both these datasets, we trained adversarial framing using
training data only. All the reported results were computed on
validation data.
On ImageNet, we applied the framing to images previ-
ously resized to 224 × 224. On UCF101, we applied the
Attack W = 1 W = 2 W = 3 W = 4
None 76.13%
RF 70.13% 67.63% 68.36% 67.25%
BF 72.99% 72.9% 72.39% 72.34%
AF 10.53% 0.44% 0.11% 0.1%
(a) ImageNet dataset
Attack W = 1 W = 2 W = 3 W = 4
None 85.95%
RF 82.57% 80.53% 81.11% 79.74%
BF 84.94% 84.73% 84.75% 84.59%
AF 65.77% 22.12% 9.45% 2.05%
(b) UCF101 dataset
Table 1: Accuracies of the classifiers (full validation set) for various values of the framing widthW .
min avg max
AF, W = 4 99.15% 99.66% 99.98%
(a) ImageNet dataset
min avg max
AF, W = 4 73.04% 89.63% 99.78%
(b) UCF101 dataset
Table 2: Success rate of targeted attacks (the higher the better) with adversarial framing of width 4. Minimum, average and maximum values
are taken across 8 different targets.
framing to images previously resized to 112 × 112. These
are standard input dimensions for aforementioned datasets.
Further analyses
Saliency visualization
Grad-CAM (Selvaraju et al. 2017) is a method for produc-
ing visual explanations for a convolutional neural network’s
predictions. For a given classifier f , input x and a class c,
it computes a heatmap visualizing how much particular re-
gions of x contribute to a score of the class c output by f .
We computed such visualizations for the pretrained
ResNet-50 from PyTorch Model Zoo, taking as input im-
ages from ImageNet. We consider both the cases with and
without an adversarial framing. Few qualitative results are
presented in Figure 21.
Classifier’s input resizing
Our method does not modify pixels of the original input
(with dimensions h × w) and only adds a framing around
it. This results in dimensions of the classifier input becom-
ing (h + 2W ) × (w + 2W ) where W is framing’s width.
This is fine for most of the state-of-the-art image classifica-
tion architectures; however, to make sure the approach also
works for classifiers with fixed input size, we conducted ex-
periments with attacking the ImageNet classifier for several
image resizing strategies:
(a) no resizing, input dimensions are changed (Vanilla).
The framing is trained with Algorithm 1.
(b) first the framing is added, and then the whole image is
rescaled back to h × w (Frame & Resize, F&R). We
use the same framing as in (a).
(c) the image is first scaled to (h− 2W )× (h− 2W ) and
then the framing is added, so that size is again h × w
1We use the following Grad-CAM implementation:
github.com/kazuto1011/grad-cam-pytorch.
(Resize & Frame, R&F). We train the framing sepa-
rately because the number of parameters is smaller than
in (a).
(d) framing is put on the original image, occluding its bor-
der pixels; the size remains unchanged (Occlude). We
use the same framing as in (c).
While we see differences in results, all the variants prove
very efficient for W = 4. Compared to other resizing strate-
gies, performance is especially degraded in Frame & Re-
size. This is expected since the adversarial framing itself is
resized and mixed with neighbouring pixels there.
Based on these results, if one can change input dimen-
sions, Vanilla approach performs the best, and otherwise
Resize & Frame leads to the highest error rate. Results are
shown in Table 3.
Related work
Universal partially-affecting attacks
Since existing attacks are quite different from our approach,
it is hard to perform a direct comparison. However, we try
to compare our work with universal partially-affecting at-
tacks using localized patches. We are aware of two works
that perform these kind of attacks, LaVAN (Karmon, Zo-
ran, and Goldberg 2018) and Adversarial patch (Brown et
al. 2017). Both methods were tested on ImageNet and hence
we will focus on that case.
Unfortunately, each of these works consider different per-
centages of the image pixels that may be altered. We thus
first recall our results for various framing sizes and then re-
late it to results from other works. With AF of width 1, we
use less than 2% of the image’s pixels and accuracy in untar-
geted setting drops to 10.53%. For W = 2, we use less than
3.5% of the image’s pixels and the accuracy is 0.44% only.
Finally, for W = 4 we use less than 7% of the image’s pix-
els to make the classifier almost completely confused (0.1%
accuracy) in untargeted setting and achieve 99.66% average
success rate in targeted setting.
Ground-truth: vase Predicted: vase Predicted: maypole
Ground-truth: lion Predicted: lion Predicted: maypole
Figure 2: Grad-CAM for inputs from ImageNet. For each example, first the original image is shown, and then the visualizations for unattacked
and attacked image. While the network correctly identifies key objects for classification in unattacked images, it concentrates on the image
borders when given adversarial input.
In LaVAN, a patch occluding about 2% of the image is
used (which is comparable to our AF of width 1). Their
universal attack has success rate 74.1% in targeted setting.
When they use the same patch to measure untargeted per-
formance, they change the output class of the classifier for
only 78.9% of data, which suggests that the accuracy of the
classifier is higher than 10.53% achieved by our method.
Adversarial patch is a method that creates localized per-
turbations which can be deployed in a real world. The au-
thors consider targeted setting only. They measure success
rate as a function of percentage of pixels used. They need to
occlude at least 10% of pixels to obtain 90% success rate.
As mentioned before, the comparison to prior works is
burdensome due to the differences in shape, localization and
design of other approaches. However, when we put all these
characteristics aside and focus on the performance in respect
to the ratio of perturbed pixels to the original ones, it seems
that our method performs better than prior approaches. Ad-
ditionally, our method is shown to generalize to videos.
Attacking video classifiers
Although extensive literature exists on attacks against im-
age classifiers, we are aware of only a few works on video
classifier attacks (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2018; Li et al. 2018;
Rey-de Castro and Rabitz 2018). While resulting in success-
ful attacks, these approaches are fully-affecting and hence
introduce adversarial artifacts in the video. In contrast, out-
put from our attack contains the original video and no infor-
Attack W = 1 W = 2 W = 3 W = 4
None 76.13%
Vanilla 10.53% 0.44% 0.11% 0.1%
F&R 56.12% 20% 5.32% 1.19%
R&F 33.87% 1.09% 0.15% 0.1%
Occlude 43.78% 3.2% 0.33% 0.12%
Table 3: Accuracies of ImageNet classifier attacked using adversar-
ial framing with different resizing strategies.
mation is lost. Moreover, the framing is constant over all
video frames, removing any “flickering” effect that could
potentially be distracting to viewers.
Conclusion
In this work, we present a simple method for attacking both
image and video classifiers. The proposed attack is universal
(i.e. the same adversarial framing can be applied in differ-
ent images or videos), efficient and effective. Moreover, our
method does not modify the original content of the input and
only adds a small border to surround it.
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